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____________ 
  
O PI N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Thomas Yadlosky, the former Director of 
Susquehanna County’s Department of Veterans Affairs, made 
unwanted sexual advances toward his part-time secretary, 
Sheri Minarsky, for years. She never reported this conduct 
and explained in her deposition the reasons she did not do so. 
Although Yadlosky was warned twice to stop his 
inappropriate behavior, it was to no avail. The County 
ultimately terminated Yadlosky when the persistent nature of 
his behavior toward Minarsky came to light.  
 
Minarsky seeks to hold Yadlosky, her supervisor, 
liable for sexual harassment, and her former employer, 
Susquehanna County, vicariously liable for said harassment. 
At issue in this case are the two elements of the Faragher-
Ellerth affirmative defense that Susquehanna County has 
raised.1 In granting summary judgment in favor of the 
                                                 
1 To successfully invoke the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense, an employer must show that (i) it “exercised 
reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when 
it might occur,” and that (ii) the plaintiff “failed to act with 
like reasonable care to take advantage of the employer’s 
safeguards and otherwise prevent harm that could have been 
avoided.”  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 
(1998). 
4 
 
County, the District Court held that the elements of this 
defense had been proven as a matter of law. We conclude that 
given the facts of this case, the availability of the defense 
regarding both the first element, whether the County took 
reasonable care to detect and eliminate the harassment, as 
well as the second element, whether Minarsky acted 
reasonably in not availing herself of the County’s anti-
harassment safeguards, should be decided by a jury. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand for further proceedings.2  
 
I. Factual Background 
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant Susquehanna County, we view the facts in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiff Minarsky. Nevertheless, 
the facts are largely undisputed. 
 
A. Yadlosky’s Alleged Harassment 
Minarsky served as a part-time secretary at the 
Susquehanna County Department of Veterans Affairs, 
working Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. On Fridays, 
Minarsky worked for Defendant Yadlosky. They worked 
together in an area separate from other County employees.3 
                                                 
2 Minarsky also challenges the District Court’s dismissal of 
her remaining state law claim of assault against Yadlosky for 
lack of supplemental jurisdiction, but that issue is moot in 
light of our decision. 
3 Yadlosky was a full-time employee, but worked out of 
different offices on the other days.  
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Minarsky alleges that soon after she started working at the 
Department in September of 2009, Yadlosky began to 
sexually harass her. Yadlosky would attempt to kiss her on 
the lips before he left each Friday, and would approach her 
from behind and embrace her, “pull[ing] [her] against him.” 
A. 98. When Minarsky was at her computer or the printer, 
Yadlosky would purportedly massage her shoulders or touch 
her face. She testified that these advances were unwanted, and 
happened frequently—nearly every week. As they worked 
together, alone, others were seldom present to observe 
Yadlosky’s conduct, other than during the holiday season 
each year, when Yadlosky asked Minarsky and other female 
employees to kiss him under mistletoe.4   
 
Yadlosky engaged in other non-physical conduct that 
Minarsky found disturbing. For example, he often questioned 
Minarsky about her whereabouts during her lunch hour and 
with whom she was eating. He called her at home on her days 
off under the pretense of a work-related query but proceeded 
to ask personal questions. Yadlosky allegedly became hostile 
if she avoided answering these calls. He sent sexually explicit 
messages from his work email to Minarsky’s work email, to 
which Minarsky did not respond. He also behaved 
unpredictably, as on one occasion when he insisted that 
Minarsky take two full days off, unpaid, to drive her daughter 
to her cancer treatment, but soon after, he chastised her for 
seeking time off—even though it fell on days they did not 
work together. 
                                                 
4 Another instance noted in the record of an employee 
observing Yadlosky’s behavior toward Minarsky is the 
incident involving Connie Orangasick. See infra pp. 6–7. 
6 
 
Minarsky alleges that the harassment intensified as 
time passed. When the harassment first began, she mildly and 
jokingly told him to stop. He did not. She claims that 
Yadlosky knew that her young daughter was ill and thus 
knew Minarsky depended on her employment to pay medical 
bills. She states that she feared speaking up to him in any 
context, let alone to protest his harassment, because he would 
react and sometimes become “nasty.” A. 142.  
 
B. Prior Reprimands 
Yadlosky reported to Sylvia Beamer, the Chief County 
Clerk, who reported to the Susquehanna County 
Commissioners. On two separate occasions, Beamer became 
aware of Yadlosky’s inappropriate behavior toward other 
women, and reprimanded him. County Commissioner 
Maryann Warren was aware of one of these incidents. First, 
in 2009, Beamer observed Yadlosky embrace a female 
employee. Beamer verbally admonished Yadlosky and told 
him that such behavior was inappropriate. Second, 
Commissioner Warren observed Yadlosky act inappropriately 
with the County’s Director of Elections in late 2011 or early 
2012. Warren notified Beamer that she saw Yadlosky hug the 
Director and kiss her on the cheek. Beamer verbally 
reprimanded Yadlosky once again and told him he could face 
termination if his inappropriate behavior continued. After 
both incidents, there was no further action or follow-up, nor 
was any notation or report placed in Yadlosky’s personnel 
file. 
 
Minarsky became aware of the first reprimand, but not 
the second. In Minarsky’s deposition, she recounted a time 
when another employee, Connie Orangasick, saw Yadlosky 
7 
 
approaching Minarsky from behind and hugging her. 
Orangasick walked by, noticed the situation, and said to 
Yadlosky, “I thought you said yesterday you’re not supposed 
to do that anymore.” A. 99. A few minutes later, he responded 
that he could do whatever he wanted “[o]ver here,” referring 
to the building where he and Minarsky were largely separated 
from other employees. A. 100. When Minarsky followed up 
with Orangasick, she learned that Beamer had warned 
Yadlosky about his inappropriate behavior. After being 
warned, he then allegedly came back to his office and joked 
about the incident to Orangasick.  
 
Minarsky also learned that other women had similar 
encounters with Yadlosky. In addition to the mistletoe 
episodes, Minarsky spoke to another secretary, Rachel 
Carrico, who mentioned that she had problems with 
Yadlosky’s hugging, as well. Also, once when Beamer was in 
the Veterans Affairs office, Minarsky observed Yadlosky as 
he was attempting to embrace Beamer, but she stopped him 
and said, “Get away from me.” A. 111.  
 
C. The County’s Anti-Harassment Policy 
On her first day of work, Minarsky read and signed 
Susquehanna County’s General Harassment Policy. It states 
that harassment based upon “sex, age, race, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, disability, sexual preference and any other 
protected classification” is prohibited. A. 166; A. 205–06. 
According to the policy, an employee could report any 
harassment to their supervisor; if the supervisor is the source 
of the harassment, the employee could report this to the Chief 
County Clerk or a County Commissioner.  
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During the four years Minarsky avers that she was 
harassed by Yadlosky, she did not report this harassment to 
either Beamer, the Chief County Clerk, or any of the County 
Commissioners. Minarsky alleges that she feared elevating 
the claims to County administrators, because Yadlosky 
repeatedly warned her not to trust the County Commissioners 
or Beamer. She claims that he would often tell her to look 
busy or else they would terminate her position. These 
warnings, Minarsky contends, along with the fact that 
Yadlosky had been reprimanded unsuccessfully for his 
inappropriate advances toward others, prevented her from 
reporting Yadlosky.  
 
D. Yadlosky’s Termination 
In her deposition, Minarsky recounted that she finally 
revealed the harassment and its emotional toll on her health to 
her physician in April of 2013. The doctor discussed the 
situation with Minarsky and emphasized the need to bring an 
end to the conduct. She encouraged Minarsky to compose an 
email to Yadlosky, so she would have some documentation.  
 
Minarsky testified that she agonized over this, but 
finally sent Yadlosky an email on July 10, 2013, prompted by 
the incident in which Yadlosky allegedly reacted negatively 
when Minarsky asked to take time off for her daughter’s 
treatment. She wrote, “I want to just let you know how 
uncomfortable I am when you hug, touch and kiss me. I don’t 
think this is appropriate at work, and would like you to stop 
doing it. I don’t want to go to Sylvia [Beamer]. I would rather 
resolve this ourselves.” A. 170. Yadlosky responded,  
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First and more importantly, I never meant to 
make you feel uncomfortable nor would I ever 
want to offend you in any way and I will STOP 
IMMEDIATELY. Secondly, almost from the 
first day you started (3 years and 9 months) I 
have been affectionate to you, among other 
people I was close to[] (only in a friendly 
manner, no other way intended), why have you 
never said anything to me before. Third, and to 
me most important, I thought we had a very 
good working relationship where we could 
approach one another on any matters. It disturbs 
me that you would put this out on an e-mail and 
not talk to me about this. Apparently I was 
wrong on thinking that. If you wanted to do this 
in writing, for proof, you could have typed this 
out and I would have signed it and you could 
have kept it. 
 
A. 170. He confronted Minarsky about the email on July 12; 
she claims that he seemed mostly concerned that his 
reputation might be tarnished if someone else read her email.  
 
Around the same time, Minarsky confided in her friend 
and co-worker, Rachel Carrico, about Yadlosky’s harassment. 
When Carrico mentioned what was happening between 
Yadlosky and Minarsky to another employee, Carrico’s 
supervisor overheard the conversation and reported 
Yadlosky’s conduct to Beamer. At first, Minarsky objected, 
for fear of losing her job. But Beamer had already been 
notified, and she interviewed Minarsky about her allegations 
within a few days. Beamer informed the County 
Commissioners, who agreed that Yadlosky should be 
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terminated. The next day, Beamer interviewed Yadlosky. 
When he admitted to the allegations, Yadlosky was 
immediately placed on paid administrative leave, and then 
terminated. The County then hired a Human Resources 
Director to oversee personnel issues. 
 
 Minarsky quit several years later, and she alleges she 
was uncomfortable in her role after Yadlosky was fired, 
because her workload increased, and because of inquiries 
from her new supervisor asking about what had transpired 
with Yadlosky and who else she had caused to be fired.  
 
II. Procedural History 
Plaintiff Minarsky filed a Complaint, Amended 
Complaint, and a Second Amended Complaint with five 
causes of action against Susquehanna County and two against 
Yadlosky. The counts against the County were: gender 
discrimination, sexual harassment through a hostile work 
environment, and quid pro quo sexual harassment, all under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; gender discrimination under 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA); and 
negligent hiring and retention under Pennsylvania state law. 
The counts against Yadlosky, all under state law, were: 
gender discrimination under the PHRA (later withdrawn), 
intentional infliction of emotion distress (IIED), and assault.  
 
The District Court granted Yadlosky’s Motion to 
Dismiss the IIED claim but denied the County’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. After discovery, the County 
moved for summary judgment. The District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and granted 
the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, while 
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dismissing the remaining count of assault against Yadlosky—
the lone remaining state law claim—for lack of supplemental 
jurisdiction. 
 
On appeal, Minarsky claims that the District Court 
erred in finding that the County had satisfied both elements of 
the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense as to the claim of 
sexual harassment through a hostile work environment and 
erred in dismissing the state law claim for lack of 
supplemental jurisdiction.  
 
III. Standard of Review  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. This Court has jurisdiction over 
final orders of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
 
We exercise plenary review over the grant or denial of 
summary judgment and apply the same standard the district 
court should have applied. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 
322 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact,” and thus the movant “is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 
749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a)). We deny summary judgment if there is enough 
evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  
 
 
 
12 
 
IV. Hostile Work Environment Claim 
On appeal, Minarsky does not contest the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on the claims for gender 
discrimination and quid pro quo sexual harassment in 
violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Thus, we focus our 
analysis on the claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile 
work environment. To establish a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim against one’s employer, a plaintiff 
employee must prove:  
 
1) the employee suffered intentional 
discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) the 
discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the 
discrimination detrimentally affected the 
plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would 
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like 
circumstances, and 5) the existence 
of respondeat superior liability. 
 
Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Defendant 
Susquehanna County only contests the fifth prong, vicarious 
liability, which frames our analysis on appeal.  
 
A. The Faragher-Ellerth Affirmative Defense 
In the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court 
established standards for when an employee who was 
harassed in the workplace by a supervisor may impute 
liability to the employer. In doing so, the Court acknowledged 
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the sensitive nature of workplace harassment: “a supervisor’s 
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with 
a particular threatening character.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.  
 
If the harassment resulted in a “tangible employment 
action” against the employee, then the employer is strictly 
liable. Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 328 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 
143 (2004)). The Supreme Court has described a tangible 
employment action as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, 
524 U.S. at 761.5  
 
However, if the harassed employee suffered no 
tangible employment action, as in the present scenario,6 the 
employer can avoid liability by asserting the Faragher-
                                                 
5 To prove a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII 
or the PHRA and quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title 
VII, a plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse 
employment action, or “an action by an employer that is 
serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.” Jones, 796 F.3d at 326 (quoting Storey v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
“Regardless of whether [tangible employment action] means 
precisely the same thing as ‘adverse employment action,’ we 
think it clear that neither phrase applies” in this case. Id. at 
328. 
6 Minarsky did not proffer evidence that she was reassigned, 
discharged, or demoted.  
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Ellerth affirmative defense. The employer must show “(a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  
 
The cornerstone of this analysis is reasonableness: the 
reasonableness of the employer’s preventative and corrective 
measures, and the reasonableness of the employee’s efforts 
(or lack thereof) to report misconduct and avoid further harm. 
Thus, the existence of a functioning anti-harassment policy 
could prove the employer’s exercise of reasonable care so as 
to satisfy the first element of the affirmative defense. 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 
To prove the second element of the affirmative 
defense, that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself 
of the employer’s “preventive or corrective opportunities,” 
the Supreme Court has held that “proof that an employee 
failed to [exercise] reasonable care to avoid harm . . . will 
normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the 
second element of the defense.” Id. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 765. 
 
B. District Court Rulings 
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District 
Court grant summary judgment on all counts. He determined 
that the County acted reasonably: first, for maintaining an 
anti-harassment policy, with which Minarsky was familiar, 
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and second, for reprimanding Yadlosky for his inappropriate 
conduct two times in the past and for promptly terminating 
Yadlosky once his misconduct toward Minarsky came to 
light.  
 
The Judge also found Minarsky’s silence—her failure 
to report the harassment—unreasonable. “The County’s 
reasonable policies and responses,” the Magistrate Judge 
wrote, “are set in stark contrast to the plaintiff’s refusal or 
unwillingness to avail herself of the County’s anti-harassment 
policy to bring Yadlosky’s conduct to the attention of County 
officials.” Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 2017 WL 4475978, 
at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017). The Magistrate Judge 
dismissed Minarsky’s alleged apprehension of the Chief 
Clerk and County Commissioners as unreasonable, because 
her mistrust of them came “from the very employee Minarsky 
claims was harassing her,” and was not sufficient to excuse 
her failure to report. Id. He cited to caselaw for the principle 
that a prolonged failure to report misconduct, when a policy 
existed to report the conduct, is unreasonable as a matter of 
law, under the facts of those cases.7 
 
The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that a failure to 
avail oneself of a sexual harassment policy, in fear of 
retaliation, may be reasonable when grounded in fact, which 
                                                 
7 E.g., Newsome v. Admin. Office of the Courts of the State of 
N.J., 51 F. App’x 76, 80 (3d Cir. 2002) (non-precedential) (a 
two-year delay in reporting harassment was unreasonable); 
Gawley v. Ind. Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 312 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(seven-month delay unreasonable); Cacciola v. Work N Gear, 
23 F. Supp. 3d 518, 531–32 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (nine-month 
delay unreasonable). 
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he distinguished from what he found to be Minarsky’s 
unfounded concerns. He contrasted Minarsky’s situation with 
the plaintiff’s in Still v. Cummins Power System, who 
observed fellow employees suffer retaliation for having 
followed the anti-harassment policy, and was thus justified in 
not reporting. 2009 WL 57021, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2009). 
 
Minarsky lodged objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation, but the District Court rejected 
Minarsky’s objections and adopted the Report and 
Recommendation in its entirety. The Court found that the 
County satisfied the Faragher-Ellerth defense: although the 
County was unaware of Yadlosky’s misconduct toward 
Minarsky, it warned him after each prior incident and fired 
him as soon as Beamer and the Commissioners were made 
aware of the allegations, all while Minarsky did not avail 
herself of the County’s sexual harassment policy because she 
feared the consequences of reporting. The District Court 
concluded, “no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff acted 
reasonably in failing to avail herself of the protections of the 
sexual harassment policy.” Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 
2017 WL 4475981, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017).  
 
C. Analysis 
1. Element One 
The first element of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense concerns whether the County “exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
765. We acknowledge that the County maintained a written 
anti-harassment policy, which Minarsky was asked to read 
17 
 
and sign on her first day. The policy prohibited harassment in 
the workplace, directed employees to report any harassment 
to a supervisor, and  provided that an employee “may” report 
to the Chief Clerk or a County Commissioner if the 
supervisor was the source of harassment. A. 166–67. 
 
The District Court determined that the County had 
reasonable policies and responses so as to satisfy the first 
prong of Faragher-Ellerth as a matter of law. We disagree. 
While Yadlosky was reprimanded twice and ultimately fired, 
we cannot agree that the County’s responses were so clearly 
sufficient as to warrant the District Court’s conclusion as a 
matter of law. Yadlosky’s conduct toward Minarsky was not 
unique; Minarsky’s deposition testimony revealed a pattern of 
unwanted advances toward multiple women other than 
herself. See, e.g., A. 102–03. 
 
In addition to the mistletoe incidents and his advances 
toward Rachel Carrico and Connie Orangasick, Yadlosky had 
also made inappropriate physical advances to two of the 
women in authority, Chief Clerk Beamer and Commissioner 
Warren. Minarsky testified that when she later attended the 
hearing to determine Yadlosky’s eligibility for unemployment 
benefits, she was shocked to learn of the extent to which 
Beamer knew of Yadlosky’s pattern of inappropriate physical 
contact: apart from the two times Beamer reprimanded 
Yadlosky for hugging other employees, Yadlosky tried to hug 
Beamer, too.8  In her deposition, Commissioner Warren also 
                                                 
8 In her deposition, Beamer testified, “Once I believe he was 
going to [hug me]. It was in my office and he started to come 
around my desk and I just said don’t go there. That was early 
on.” A. 192:10–12. 
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testified that Yadlosky attempted to hug her, put his arm 
around her, or kiss her on the cheek approximately ten times.9 
Although as a Commissioner, Warren was in a position to 
discipline Yadlosky for his behavior, and although she raised 
his misconduct to County Commissioner Hall, neither Warren 
nor Hall reprimanded Yadlosky.10 Thus, County officials 
were faced with indicators that Yadlosky’s behavior formed a 
pattern of conduct, as opposed to mere stray incidents, yet 
they seemingly turned a blind eye toward Yadlosky’s 
harassment.  
 
Was the policy in place effective? Knowing of his 
behavior, and knowing that Minarsky worked alone with 
Yadlosky every Friday, should someone have ensured that 
she was not being victimized? Was his termination not so 
much a reflection of the policy’s effectiveness, but rather, did 
it evidence the County’s exasperation, much like the straw 
that broke the camel’s back? We do not answer these 
questions, but conclude that there exists enough of a dispute 
of material fact, and thus a jury should judge all of the facts 
as to whether the County “exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior,” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
                                                 
9 Warren: “He would kind of giggle like a girl, come around 
the table and lean over and . . . hug me and tried to kiss me on 
the cheek. . . . I backed the chair up, told him to get away, 
[asked him what he was] doing and to stop being a jerk.” A. 
260:16–18, 21–22. 
10 In her deposition, Warren stated that she needed another 
Commissioner to sign off if she were to take any action 
against Yadlosky. 
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765, and thereby determine whether the County satisfied the 
first element of Faragher-Ellerth.  
 
2. Element Two 
The second element, regarding the reasonableness of 
Minarsky’s failure to report Yadlosky’s behavior, presents a 
similarly troubling set of facts. On the one hand, she 
remained silent and did nothing to avoid further harm. On the 
other hand, her silence might be viewed as objectively 
reasonable in light of the persuasive facts Minarsky has set 
forth. 
 
We are sensitive to the Supreme Court’s emphasis that 
the second Faragher-Ellerth element is tied to the objective 
of Title VII, to avoid harm, rather than provide redress. 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (“[N]o award against a liable 
employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts 
could have avoided.”). We also acknowledge that our case 
precedent has routinely found the passage of time coupled 
with the failure to take advantage of the employer’s anti-
harassment policy to be unreasonable, as did the District 
Court here. E.g., Jones, 796 F.3d at 329.11  
 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore Minarsky’s testimony 
as to why she did not report Yadlosky’s conduct, and we 
                                                 
11 In Jones, the plaintiff’s ten-year delay in reporting her 
alleged harassment was just one factor we credited in 
concluding that the defendant satisfied Faragher-Ellerth. 
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believe that a jury could find that she did not act unreasonably 
under the circumstances.12  
                                                 
12 This appeal comes to us in the midst of national news 
regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant 
sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not 
reported by the victims. It has come to light, years later, that 
people in positions of power and celebrity have exploited 
their authority to make unwanted sexual advances. In many 
such instances, the harasser wielded control over the harassed 
individual’s employment or work environment. In nearly all 
of the instances, the victims asserted a plausible fear of 
serious adverse consequences had they spoken up at the time 
that the conduct occurred. While the policy underlying 
Faragher-Ellerth places the onus on the harassed employee to 
report her harasser, and would fault her for not calling out this 
conduct so as to prevent it, a jury could conclude that the 
employee’s non-reporting was understandable, perhaps even 
reasonable. That is, there may be a certain fallacy that 
underlies the notion that reporting sexual misconduct will end 
it. Victims do not always view it in this way. Instead, they 
anticipate negative consequences or fear that the harassers 
will face no reprimand; thus, more often than not, victims 
choose not to report the harassment. 
Recent news articles report that studies have shown that not 
only is sex-based harassment in the workplace pervasive, but 
also the failure to report is widespread. Nearly one-third of 
American women have experienced unwanted sexual 
advances from male coworkers, and nearly a quarter of 
American women have experienced such advances from men 
who had influence over the conditions of their employment, 
according to an ABC News/Washington Post poll from 
October of 2017. Most all of the women who experienced 
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Although we have often found that a plaintiff’s 
outright failure to report persistent sexual harassment is 
unreasonable as a matter of law, particularly when the 
opportunity to make such complaints exists, we write to 
clarify that a mere failure to report one’s harassment is not 
per se unreasonable. Moreover, the passage of time is just one 
factor in the analysis. Workplace sexual harassment is highly 
                                                                                                             
harassment report that the male harassers faced no 
consequences. ABC News/Washington Post, Unwanted 
Sexual Advances: Not Just a Hollywood Story (Oct. 17, 
2017), http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
1192a1SexualHarassment.pdf.  
Additionally, three out of four women who have been 
harassed fail to report it. A 2016 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Select Task Force study 
found that approximately 75 percent of those who 
experienced harassment never reported it or filed a complaint, 
but instead would “avoid the harasser, deny or downplay the 
gravity of the situation, or attempt to ignore, forget, or endure 
the behavior.” EEOC Select Task Force,  
Harassment in the Workplace, at v (June 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/rep
ort.pdf. Those employees who faced harassing behavior did 
not report this experience “because they fear[ed] disbelief of 
their claim, inaction on their claim, blame, or social or 
professional retaliation.” Id.; see also Stefanie Johnson, et al., 
Why We Fail to Report Sexual Harassment, Harvard Business 
Review (Oct. 4, 2016), http://hbr.org/2016/10/why-we-fail-to-
report-sexual-harassment (women do not report harassment 
because of retaliation fears, the bystander effect, and male-
dominated work environments). 
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circumstance-specific, and thus the reasonableness of a 
plaintiff’s actions is a paradigmatic question for the jury, in 
certain cases. If a plaintiff’s genuinely held, subjective belief 
of potential retaliation from reporting her harassment appears 
to be well-founded, and a jury could find that this belief is 
objectively reasonable, the trial court should not find that the 
defendant has proven the second Faragher-Ellerth element as 
a matter of law. Instead, the court should leave the issue for 
the jury to determine at trial.  
 
Here, Minarsky asserts several countervailing forces 
that prevented her from reporting Yadlosky’s conduct to 
Beamer or a County Commissioner: her fear of Yadlosky’s 
hostility on a day-to-day basis and retaliation by having her 
fired; her worry of being terminated by the Chief Clerk; and 
the futility of reporting, since others knew of his conduct, yet 
it continued. All of these factors were aggravated by the 
pressing financial situation she faced with her daughter’s 
cancer treatment. 
 
First, the particular nature of Minarsky’s working 
relationship with Yadlosky complicated the situation. They 
worked alone one day each week, away from others, and on 
other days he continued to monitor her, ostensibly utilizing 
his control over her work environment to harass her. 
Appellees argue that the superior-subordinate dynamic is 
unremarkable, because all Faragher-Ellerth cases involve a 
power imbalance wherein the harasser controls the working 
conditions of the harassed. We disagree that this is irrelevant; 
the degree of control and specific power dynamic can offer 
context to the plaintiff’s subjectively held fear of speaking up, 
for instance, if the supervisor “took advantage of the power 
vested in them . . . to facilitate their abuse” or harassment.  
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Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 458 (2013) (quoting 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801). 
 
Second, when Minarsky attempted to assert herself in 
the workplace, she alleges that Yadlosky became “nasty,” 
which deepened her fear of defending herself or disclosing 
Yadlosky’s misconduct. For example, if she tried to request 
personal days off or ignored his phone calls on days she was 
not working, he became ill-tempered. She said, 
 
He was just unpredictable with his 
temperament. I had to watch what I said to him. 
I had to watch how I acted around him. It 
seemed if he didn’t get what he wanted, I 
seemed to get treated more miserably. The day 
would be harder if I spoke up about anything he 
said or [did] in the office. I had to just watch 
what I did. 
 
A. 153:15–20; see also A. 158:6 (“[H]e had a temper.”).  
Moreover, when asked why she was unable to vocally protest 
Yadlosky’s attempts to kiss her, Minarsky stated that she 
needed her job to pay her daughter’s medical bills, and 
worried that she might lose her job or otherwise be retaliated 
against if she voiced her distress.13 When Yadlosky would 
approach Minarsky because “he thought he should kiss [her] 
on the lips before he left” each Friday, A. 97:21–22, 
Minarsky stated in her deposition, “I did not know how to 
respond. It happened so quickly. I was under probation so I 
                                                 
13 Minarsky did, however, refuse to walk into his office if 
there was mistletoe hanging, and admits that this was the only 
time she specifically voiced her discomfort.   
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was concerned that . . . if I did not, what was going to happen 
[to my job].”14 A. 98:10–12. Although she avers that she 
meekly protested, she states, “I know I didn’t dare speak up to 
him.” A. 99:10–11. 
 
We distinguish this situation from one in which the 
employee’s fear of retaliation is generalized and unsupported 
by evidence. Several courts have held that a generalized fear 
of retaliation is insufficient to explain a long delay in 
reporting sexual harassment. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colo. 
Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(citing cases from the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals where a generalized fear of 
retaliation did not excuse a two-to-four month delay in 
reporting harassment).15 The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has held that a fear of retaliation that is substantiated by 
evidence in the record may excuse a failure to report, and the 
jury should decide the credibility of the witness expressing 
this fear. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(finding “evidence in the record that Burns feared retaliation, 
which is bolstered by the fact that others expressed fear of 
                                                 
14 When Minarsky first began working at the County, her 
employment was probationary for the first six months. 
15 See Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 280–81, 287 
(5th Cir. 2000) (a four-month delay was unreasonable); 
Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 
2008) (two-month delay); Williams v. Missouri Dep’t of 
Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2005) (four-
month delay); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Svcs., Inc., 347 
F.3d 1272, 1277, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2003) (two-and-a-half-
month delay). 
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retaliation for mere participation in the . . . investigation into 
[the harassment, along with] evidence that Burns had earlier 
reported her concerns, including to her direct supervisor”).  
 
Here, Minarsky identifies instances where asserting 
herself rendered her working conditions even more hostile, 
and she was led to believe that she should not protest her 
supervisor’s conduct. Presented with these facts, a reasonable 
jury could find that Minarsky’s fear of aggravating her work 
environment was sufficiently specific, rather than simply a 
generalized, unsubstantiated fear.16 
 
Third, although Minarsky’s fear of retaliation was 
subjective, we disagree with the District Court’s view that it 
was clearly unfounded. Yadlosky discouraged her from using 
the anti-harassment policy by underscoring that she could not 
trust the Commissioners or the Chief Clerk—those to whom 
she would report the harassment. He warned her that they 
might “get rid” of Minarsky and her job, which she alleged 
“made it very hard for [her] to think of going to them.” A. 
101:20–21, 24–25. The District Court discounted this because 
it was Yadlosky himself who made these comments. But the 
fact that he was the harasser does not mean that Minarsky 
should have disbelieved his comments about people in 
authority whom he knew better than she did, and does not 
render her fear unfounded. Minarsky was merely a part-time 
employee. Yadlosky was the Director of Veterans Affairs for 
the County. We do not think that her failure to avail herself of 
                                                 
16 The trial judge can instruct the jury that a plaintiff’s fears 
must be specific, not generalized, in order to defeat the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense.  
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this avenue was necessarily unreasonable, and a jury could 
find the same. 
 
Fourth, Minarsky discovered that the County had 
known of Yadlosky’s behavior and merely slapped him on the 
wrist, without more—bolstering Minarsky’s claim that she 
feared the County would ignore any report she made. “[H]e 
had been warned and it went nowhere,” she observed. A. 
142:21. She proffered evidence that Yadlosky openly 
disregarded his behavioral warnings in front of Minarsky and 
continued to emphasize distrust with the County officials. She 
said, 
 
[The warning] didn’t phase him at all and he’s 
telling me not to trust the Chief Clerk, the 
Commissioners; they would get rid of me; they 
would get rid of my job. I didn’t know how to 
perceive that. Was this going to mean my job if 
I speak up? It didn’t help the first time with the 
first person speaking up. 
 
A. 142:22–143:1 (emphasis added). A jury could find that 
Minarsky reasonably believed that availing herself of the anti-
harassment policy would be futile, if not detrimental. See, 
e.g., Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 437 
(5th Cir. 2005) (a harassed employee “is not obligated to go 
through the wasted motion of reporting the harassment” if the 
employee reasonably believes that subsequent complaints 
would be futile).  
 
Fifth, a reasonable jury could consider the pernicious 
nature of the harassment compounded with its frequency and 
duration to contextualize Minarsky’s actions. Minarsky 
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endured over three-and-a-half years of being kissed on the 
lips, touched, and embraced by her boss, without her consent, 
all while he sent her explicit emails and monitored her 
whereabouts. She witnessed him hugging others and asking 
female employees to kiss him under mistletoe. Minarsky 
seemingly agonized over her situation. She only revealed her 
harassment to her husband years later, because she knew he 
would have urged her to quit even though her family 
desperately needed the money. When Minarsky eventually 
did share her situation with her husband, she expressed that if 
she quit, she then feared Yadlosky would harass her 
replacement.17 Even then, it was only after Minarsky’s 
medical doctor emphasized that Minarsky was being treated 
inappropriately, and encouraged her to confront Yadlosky to 
hopefully bring an end to the harassment and its physical and 
emotional toll, did Minarsky finally do so. 
 
Rather than view this merely as Minarsky’s idle delay 
in reporting, a jury could consider the aggravating effect of 
prolonged, agonizing harassment as a way to credit 
Minarsky’s fear of worsening her situation.  
 
Appellees argue that Minarsky’s behavior was 
unreasonable, given her knowledge of the County’s anti-
harassment policy and her failure to use the policy, by 
pointing to the line in Minarsky’s email to Yadlosky, “I don’t 
want to go to Sylvia. I would rather resolve this ourselves.” 
A. 170. While Appellees characterize this as evidence 
                                                 
17 Minarsky: “I relayed to him that I was concerned about, if I 
quit, Tom [will do] this to the next person. . . . How do I quit, 
knowing that [Yadlosky is] going to continue this? How do I 
get him to understand that it’s wrong?” A. 157:20–21, 22–24. 
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Minarsky deliberately refrained from using the policy’s 
protections, Minarsky averred in her deposition that it was her 
way of informing Yadlosky that she would resort to the 
harassment policy if his conduct did not change.18 Whether 
this evidence negates the reasonableness of Minarsky’s non-
reporting is for the jury, not us, to decide. 
 
In sum, Minarsky has produced several pieces of 
evidence of her fear that sounding the alarm on her harasser 
would aggravate her work environment or result in her 
termination. A jury could consider this evidence and find her 
reaction to be objectively reasonable. We therefore cannot 
uphold the District Court’s conclusion that Minarsky’s 
behavior was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
 
Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the County and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
V. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Minarsky appeals the District Court’s ruling not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her sole state-law 
claim of assault against Yadlosky. Because we vacate the 
dismissal of the hostile work environment claim under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, on remand, the District Court will 
have a federal claim once again. The Court can therefore 
choose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-
law claim, and thus we vacate the dismissal of the assault 
                                                 
18 “That was my way of saying I hadn’t gone to the Chief 
Clerk but, if I need to, I will.” A. 115:22–23. 
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claim, as well. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron 
Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
